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Abstract 
 
While period fertility started to drop significantly below replacement 
in most Western European countries during the 1970s and 1980s, most 
fertility surveys, value studies and opinion polls have found that the number 
of children considered ideal for society or for one’s own family has 
remained above two children per woman. These surveys have led to the 
expectation that – sooner or later – period fertility would recover in Europe. 
The most recent data from the Eurobarometer 2001 survey, however, suggest 
that in the German-speaking parts of Europe the average ideal family sizes 
given by younger men and women have fallen as low as 1.7 children. This 
paper examines the consistency and the credibility of these new findings, 
which – if they are indeed indications of a new trend – may alter the current 
discussion about future fertility trends in Europe.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
European Demographic Research Papers are working papers that deal with 
all-European issues or with issues that are important to a large number of 
European countries. All contributions have received only limited review. 
* * * 
This material may not be reproduced without written permission from the 
authors. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The persistence of high family size ideals has remained a puzzle for 
demographers in the industrial world. Despite declines in period fertility well 
below replacement level in many European countries, women and men have 
consistently responded to surveys saying they would ideally like to have at 
least two or more children. For some, the high ideal has implied unmet 
demand for children and an opportunity for pro-natalist public policies to 
increase achieved fertility (Chesnais, 1996 and 2000). For others, the 
continuation of high ideal family size suggests that period fertility will 
eventually rise, if and when the tempo-depressing effects of delayed 
childbearing come to an end (Bongaarts 2001). Even sceptics of the 
predictive power of stated fertility wonder at the normative strength of the 
two-child ideal (Livi Bacci 2001). 
In this note, we report evidence that the two-child ideal may be 
beginning to change in several European countries. The latest round of the 
Eurobarometer survey (2001) shows that while in most countries women of 
all ages still have family size ideals above replacement, national averages in 
Austria and Germany have fallen well below replacement. Younger cohorts 
in Austria and Germany report even lower ideal family sizes, averaging 1.7 
children. Both Austria and Germany were also among the first countries to 
experience declines in period fertility well below replacement levels. It 
appears that changing actual family sizes are, at last, beginning to have an 
effect on the ideals of the next generation. 
The emergence of below-replacement ideal fertility, if it persists, 
may mark a new stage in below-replacement fertility regimes. In a recent 
paper Bongaarts (2001:276) writes: “whether desired family size remains at 
or drops below two is the most crucial issue determining post-transitional 
fertility.“ This paper presents the first evidence of the beginning of a decline 
in ideal family size below the two-child norm. 
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BACKGROUND 
Fertility preferences have been gathered as part of surveys for 
several decades now. However, initial hopes that reported family size ideals 
and intentions would lead to improved accuracy of fertility forecasts were 
soon disappointed. Earlier reports have shown that family size ideals have 
fallen little or slowly in the face of substantial fertility declines. In high 
fertility countries, stated fertility preferences tend to be lower than the actual 
figures, an indication to some of an “unmet need“ for contraception. In low 
fertility countries, however, just the opposite pattern has held. For the last 
several decades, aggregate fertility levels have fallen well short of stated 
ideals. 
Explanations for the divergence of attitudes and behaviour have 
taken several forms. Westoff and Ryder (1977) argued that respondents are 
simply not in a position to anticipate the future course of their lives and in 
particular the period conditions which may or may not make childbearing 
more or less propitious. Even when aggregate fertility matches well with 
aggregate expectations, individuals are not able to anticipate their own 
fertility very well (Westoff 1981)  
Nambodiri (1983) emphasizes that preferences themselves change 
over the life cycle and the decision to have a child has to be considered in a 
sequential and conditional process. Monnier (1987), following the approach 
of rational choice theories (Yamaguchi and Ferguson 1995), argues that 
fertility intentions have to be examined at different parities, because 
conditions and individual plans may change after each new birth.  
Finally, many have argued that fertility ideals reported on surveys 
reflect societal norms and the respondent’s expectation of what surveyors 
want to hear (Livi Bacci 2001; Livi Bacci and De Santis 2001). Indeed, the 
two-child family – one boy and one girl – has long been considered the ideal 
family structure in Western European countries. 
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Despite measurement difficulties, changes in fertility preferences 
still play a causal role in most theories of fertility decline (Lesthaeghe and 
Surkyn 1988, Van de Kaa 2001). Recent research on the dynamics of 
behavioural diffusion establishes a strong relation between desired and 
achieved fertility (National Research Council 2001). Theoretical models 
such as that built by Kohler (2001) assume a strong connection between the 
achieved fertility of others and one’s own desired fertility. 
Sociological theory sees changing ideals as a precursor to changing 
behaviour (Ajzen and Fishbein 1980; Rindfuss et al. 1988; Shoen et al. 
1997). In contrast, in his modelling of the dynamics of changing preferences, 
Lee (1980) has shown that under many conditions changing intentions will 
lag behind period fertility as a result of compositional effects within the 
population. 
 
SURVEY METHODOLOGY 
The Eurobarometer survey is designed for comparative analysis 
among national populations. Stratified sampling assured nearly equal 
probability samples of about 1,000 respondents in each of the 15 EU nations. 
The sample size allows equally precise estimates for small and large 
countries, as well as some comparison between sub-groups broken down by 
sex, age, and educational attainment.  
The survey used a single uniform questionnaire design, with 
particular attention being paid to equivalent question wording across 
languages. Question wording is of particular importance in measuring 
fertility intentions, as responses depend significantly on how the questions 
are phrased, even small differences in wording leading to considerable 
differences in stated intentions. The comparability of the results across 
nations was also enhanced by the use of a single multilingual survey 
collection team. 
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The 2001 round of the Eurobarometer used new wording for the 
questions on fertility ideals, in order to distinguish between the perceived 
societal ideals and the respondents’ own personal ideals. 
Table 1 shows the fertility questions in the recent 2001 round of the 
Eurobarometer, as well as the questions administered in the 1979 and 1989 
rounds.  
 
Table 1 The Changing Wording of Eurobarometer Ideal Family Size. 
Questions. 
Year Question 
order 
Question wording 
1979  In your country today, what do you think is the ideal 
number of children for a family? 
1989  In your country today, what do you think the ideal 
number of children is for a family like yours or the one 
you might have? 
2001 (1) Generally speaking, what do you think is the ideal 
number of children for a family? 
2001 (2) And for you personally, what would be the ideal 
number of children you would like to have or would 
have liked to have had? 
Note: All respondents in 2001 were asked both questions on ideal family size. 
The 2001 survey included questions on children the respondents already had 
(“Have you had any children? If yes, how many?”), and the children they still 
plan to have ("How many children do you (still) plan to have?").  The format of 
the surveys was a face-to-face interview. 
 
 
The findings we report for 2001 are brought to light in part, we 
believe, by the addition of a new question of fertility ideals that asks 
respondents the ideal number of children they themselves would like to 
have. In the past, questions have been ambiguous about whether the family 
size at stake was the respondent’s own or that of the respondent's larger 
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society. In this note, we report answers from the personal ideals item1 
(question 2001 (2) in Table 1), as this is the most direct measure of the 
respondent’s own attitudes. 
The results from the 1979 and 1989 round questions are not strictly 
comparable to the latest round. In the 1979 and 1989 the average societal 
ideal family size of Europeans was 2.37 and 2.16 respectively, but the two 
rounds did not include the same list of countries2. Individual countries 
clustered around this average. Ireland had the highest preferences, with 
average ideals of 3.62 and 2.79 children per family, respectively in 1979 and 
1989. Germany and Luxembourg showed the lowest desired family size in 
both surveys, with an ideal number of children just below two in 1989. The 
results from the earlier surveys are broadly consistent with the question on 
the generally ideal number of children for a family asked in 2001 (question 
2001 (1) in Table 1). Ireland and Greece have the highest ideals and 
Germany is the last country on the list, showing together with Austria 
societal childbearing ideals just below 2. 
In addition to the items on ideal family size, the Eurobarometer 
questionnaire includes items that allow the calculation of expected family 
size. This is computed by adding the number of children that respondents 
already have to the number they still plan to have. The intentions question, 
which follows the item on the actual number of children, as well as several 
items asking about childbearing goals at age 20 and possible reasons why 
these goals might not have been achieved3, encourages respondents to think 
                                                 
1 Changes in question wording make it difficult to compare different rounds of the 
survey. In particular, there was no question on personal ideals in the past. 
2 The 1979 round is referred to EU-9, and that of 1989 is referred to EU-12. The 
EU-9 includes Belgium, Germany, Denmark, France, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. The EU-12 encompasses the nine countries 
mentioned plus Spain, Greece and Portugal. The Eurobarometer 2001 was carried 
out in the EU-15, consisting of EU-12 as well as Austria, Finland and Sweden.  
3 The question on desired fertility at age 20 appears to have been difficult for 
respondents to answer. Only 60% responded by giving a specific number of desired 
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even more concretely about their own situation, taking into account not only 
their ideals, but also the obstacles that might interfere with achieving ideal 
family size.  
 
RESULTS 
We now present the results of the 2001 Eurobarometer round. We 
focus on women aged 20 to 34 years. The cross-national differences in ideal 
family size for women are broadly consistent with the differences observed 
for men. However, men’s responses show greater variability, as do those of 
women aged 15-19, perhaps because family size questions are more abstract 
for these youngest cohorts. We divide the population at age 35 in order to 
distinguish between women who had largely finished childbearing and those 
who had not yet begun or were still in the middle of their childbearing 
career. The 35-year age division provided us with sufficient sample sizes to 
estimate the two age groups separately. 
                                                                                                                   
children. Among these, the answers tended to be low, suggesting that some may 
have understood the question to refer to the number of births they would have liked 
to have during their early twenties rather than over their entire reproductive career. 
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Figure 1  Mean Personal Ideal Family Size of Women by Age group and 
Country. 
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Our main finding is that for younger cohorts ideal family size has 
fallen well below replacement in Austria and in both the former East and 
West Germany4. Figure 1 shows the average ideal family size by age in each 
of the 15 countries. The slopes of the lines show the degree of change 
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4 Germany has consistently had the lowest ideal or desired fertility in the European 
Union, based on the last surveys conducted on an international scale, such as the 
Fertility and Family Surveys, or the World Value Surveys.   
between younger and older generations. Looking at the younger cohorts, we 
see that the three German-speaking regions form their own cluster of low 
fertility ideals, with ideal family size averaging 1.6 in the former East 
Germany, and about 1.7 in both Austria and the former West Germany. No 
other European country in the Eurobarometer has family size ideals that 
average below two5. In fact, ideals in other low fertility countries like Italy, 
Spain and Greece are all well above two children6. 
As the figure shows, younger cohorts generally preferred smaller 
family sizes than older ones. Although the sampling errors for each sub-
group are fairly large, on the order of 0.07-0.17, we still see evidence of 
rapidly declining preferences in Germany and Austria, as well as Italy, 
Portugal, Spain, Ireland, and the Netherlands. The EU average is also 
declining7. This comparison between age groups probably reveals both 
temporal and life-cycle influences: the older cohorts both grew up in a 
different time and were surveyed at an older age. It may be that the ideals of 
the younger cohorts will approach those of the older cohorts as they age. 
However, this would run counter to the general tendency of cohorts, whose 
ideals fall slightly as they converge towards achieved fertility levels that are 
typically well below the ideals expressed at younger ages.  
                                                 
5 Non-response rates for the whole population across countries ranged from 0 to 
about 20 percent. Non-response levels were not associated with differences in ideal 
family size. For example, Austria had a high non-response rate and West Germany 
had one of the lowest. Non-respondents were less likely to already be parents. 
However, they differed little in other characteristics. Non-responses have been 
excluded from all the statistics reported here, except where noted. 
6 The German mean personal ideal family size is statistically different from that of 
the other countries (apart from Austria).  
7 The decline in the mean personal ideal family size across cohorts is statistically 
significant for the European Union as a whole, and for several individual countries, 
such as: Germany, Austria, Portugal, Spain, and Ireland, while for Italy and the 
Netherlands the statistical evidence of such a decline is weaker (only 10% level). 
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Figure 2 Distribution of Personal Ideal Family Size, Women aged 20 to 34. 
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The average is a summary of the entire distribution of ideal family 
sizes. Countries with similar average ideals can well have quite different 
distributions of ideal family sizes. Figure 2 shows the distribution of women 
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in each country, distinguishing those above, below, and at the two-child 
ideal8.  
In the figure, countries are ordered by the proportion of women with 
family size ideals above two children, an ordering that corresponds well to 
mean ideal family size, shown in the right hand margin. The figures within 
the middle sub-section of each bar give the percentages preferring exactly 
two children.  
A notable feature of the distribution of ideal family size is the 
substantial proportions with ideals of three or more children in some 
countries. In Italy and Greece, countries with current period total fertility of 
about 1.2 and 1.3 respectively, well over one quarter of younger women say 
they would like to have three or more children. By contrast, only about 10 
percent of German women in this age group would prefer such large 
families.  
Interestingly, we see that the two-child ideal is not less common in 
the German-speaking countries than in most other European countries. The 
lower averages in Austria and Germany instead stem from lower proportions 
wanting big families and higher proportions wanting small families. The 
two-child ideal is least common in Finland and Ireland, not because of lower 
fertility preferences, but rather because so many women prefer more than 
two children that the proportion preferring exactly two is actually smaller 
than in the countries with lower average ideal family sizes. 
                                                 
8 This categorization allows us to see the differences in the pattern of ideal family 
size within each country. Further breakdowns distinguishing between those who 
prefer no and one child or those who prefer three or four children tend to be unstable 
because of small sample sizes.  
 12
Table 2 Mean Personal Ideal and Expected Family Sizes of Younger 
European Women (20 to 34 years). 
Average Countries with this average Countries with this average  
 Ideal Family Size  Expected Family Size  
        
2.5 Finland,  France, U. Kingdom, Ireland    
2.4 Denmark, Sweden      
2.3 Greece,    United Kingdom,  
2.2 Belgium,    France,  Finland  
2.1* Netherlands, Italy    Greece, Ireland  
2.0 Portugal, Spain, Luxembourg  Belgium, Sweden  
1.9     Luxembourg, Portugal  
1.8+     Netherlands,   
1.7 Austria, West Germany  Spain,   
1.6 East Germany      
1.5     Austria,  Italy  
1.4     West Germany   
1.3     East Germany   
* EU-15 average Ideal Family Size 
+ EU-15 average Expected Family Size 
 
 
The relative positioning of national populations according to 
expected family size tells a very similar story. Expected family size is the 
sum of the number of children a woman has already had at the time of the 
survey and the number of children the respondent “still plan[s] to have“. It is 
considered a more accurate, and constraint-influenced measure than “ideal“ 
family size. Table 2 shows that the number of children a woman actually 
expects is universally smaller than her stated ideal. For nearly all of the 
countries, average expected family sizes are 0.2-0.4 smaller than average 
ideal family sizes. The exceptions are interesting. Italian women, who live in 
a country in which current period fertility is only slightly more than half of 
the “ideal“ family size reported here, expect 0.6 children less than their 
(perhaps unrealistically high) childbearing ideals. 
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In Austria and Germany expected family sizes of 1.5 and 1.4 
respectively, are quite close to current period total fertility. This is an 
indication that completed cohort fertility of these younger cohorts will be 
substantially below replacement. The expectations of the younger cohorts 
are lower than the tempo-adjusted period total fertility rates, which suggest 
that in the absence of postponement of births at all ages the period TFR 
would be about 1.89 (Bongaarts 2001). 
 
EXPLANATIONS 
What could explain the unusually low ideal family sizes among 
young Austrians and Germans? At this early time, it is not possible to give a 
definitive answer, but the explanation that seems most compelling to us is 
that family size ideals have fallen as part of societal shifts toward low-
fertility norms. This shift occurs about one generation after below-
replacement fertility ideals were reached, when new cohorts have been 
thoroughly submerged in a culture of small family sizes.  
We first discuss two alternative explanations for the extremely low 
fertility ideals of Germany and Austria, and then turn to the possibility of 
generational lags and their implications. 
A demographically uninteresting explanation is that “ideal family 
size“, as reported by Germans and Austrians in the survey, means something 
different than it does for other nationalities. If this were the case, the low 
ideals of German-speaking women would just be due to a different 
interpretation of the questionnaire rather than to a true difference in 
underlying family size ideals. While we cannot rule out the possibility that 
Germans simply responded differently to the survey instrument, this seems 
                                                 
9 A full assessment of the reliability of women’s expectation is beyond the scope of 
our paper. However, a comparison between birth expectations and subsequent 
behaviour, from recent follow-up surveys carried out in some European countries 
such as Greece and Italy, has shown high consistency between expected and 
achieved fertility (Symeonidou 2000, Menniti 2001).  
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rather unlikely to us. The question wordings in the Eurobarometer items on 
ideal family sizes are similar not only in their dictionary definitions, but also 
in their connotations. The word “ideal” has very similar connotations in 
German and English, as well as in the Romance languages.  
 
Table 3 Selected Economic and Demographic Indicators for Europeans. 
COUNTRIES 
Unemployment 
rates, 2001 
Average 
annual growth 
rates 1999-
2001 
(percentage) 
Mean age at 
1st Birth  
 2000 
Total 
Fertility 
Rate, 
2000 
Year  
in which TFR  
fell  
 Total Youth Total Youth          <2  <1.5 
Austria 3.6 6.0 -3.3 0.6 26.3  1.34 1973  1985 
Belgium 6.6 15.3 -7.8 -10.8 26.9 * 1.66 1973  – 
Denmark 4.3 8.3 -3.5 -5.7 27.5 + 1.77 1973  – 
Finland 9.1 19.9 -3.6 -2.5 27.4  1.73 1969  – 
France 8.6 18.7 -6.5 -9.8 28.7 " 1.89 1975  – 
Germany 7.6 8.4 -3.9 0.8 28.0 " 1.36 1971  1983 
W. Germany – – – – 28.0  1.38 1970  1975 
E. Germany – – – – 27.6  1.22 1972  1991 
Greece 7.9 28.0 -4.1 -3.9 27.3 " 1.29 1983  1989 
Ireland 3.8 6.2 -10.7 -9.0 27.8  1.89 1992  – 
Italy 9.5 27.0 -5.1 -4.4 28.7 ° 1.23 1977  1984 
Luxembourg 2.4 6.7 0.0 -0.5 28.4  1.79 1970  – 
Netherlands 2.4 4.4 -8.3 -13.5 28.6  1.72 1973  – 
Portugal 4.1 9.2 -3.0 1.9 26.4  1.50 1984  1994 
Spain 13.0 20.8 -5.9 -8.8 29.0 " 1.24 1982  1988 
Sweden 5.1 11.8 -9.7 -5.6 27.9  1.54 1969  – 
United 
Kingdom 5.0 10.5 -5.1 -4.9 29.1  1.65 1974  – 
EU-15 7.6 13.9 -5.2 -6.6 27.8  1.53 1975  – 
Note: When indicated, data refer to (* ) 1993, (+) 1996, (º) 1997 and (") 1999. 
The TFR was below 1.5 in Denmark and Luxembourg during the mid-1980s. It was exactly 
1.5 in Portugal in 2000, higher than 2 in Sweden again in 1989-92, and slightly less than 1.5 
in the EU-15 in the second half of the 1990s. The EU-15 mean age at first birth is just the 
average value of all the EU countries. 
Source: for Economic Indicators: OECD, 2002; for Demographic Indicators: Council of 
Europe, 2001, and EUROSTAT 2001, for the EU-15 average.  
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An alternative explanation would be that lower fertility ideals reflect 
a difference in contemporary socio-economic or demographic conditions. 
For example, poor economic conditions, especially for the young, may 
depress family size ideals, making the young more pessimistic about their 
ability to find a partner and to afford having children. Taking unemployment 
levels, both for the total work force and for people under age 25, as an 
indicator of general economic conditions, however, we see that this 
explanation does not hold for the German-speaking countries. As seen in 
Table 3, poorer economic conditions do not appear to be depressing fertility 
ideals. If anything, the association is in the opposite direction: Austria and 
Germany have low unemployment rates and low ideal family sizes, while in 
Spain and Greece both unemployment and family size ideals are relatively 
high.  
Table 3 also shows some other factors that could account for 
differences in family size ideals for the young. Timing of family formation 
might explain differences in ideals, particularly among the broad age group 
20 to 34, which mixes women who may be well into their childbearing years 
with those who have not yet found a partner and for whom family size ideals 
remain abstract. Austria and Germany are not unusual in either the mean age 
at first birth, the median age at first union, or the proportion aged 20 to 30 
that are married. It therefore does not appear that lower family sizes are due 
to Austrian and German respondents being at different stages of their 
childbearing career than in other countries. Lower expressed ideals might 
reflect less childbearing in the year the survey was taken. The period fertility 
rate of Austria and German, however, while low, is not lower than in Italy, 
Greece, or Spain, all countries with higher ideal family sizes. 
To us, the most appealing explanation is that sub-replacement 
fertility ideals in Austria and Germany have emerged as a natural 
consequence of a history of low-fertility. Young cohorts in Germany and 
Austria have witnessed below-replacement fertility for their entire lives, not 
just the last few years. The influences of a cohort’s experience on their 
present fertility ideals are probably numerous. Young Austrians and 
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Germans are not only more likely than other Europeans to have grown up in 
smaller families; they are more and more likely to have had friends, 
classmates, and cousins in smaller families as well10.  
More broadly, it may be that a culture of low fertility has emerged in 
German-speaking Europe. Changes in achieved family sizes may not persist 
without eventually inspiring broader cultural changes. TV soaps featuring 
large families are not a feature of German or Austrian television (except 
through American imports). By contrast, in Italy there is the hit sitcom “Un 
Medico in Famiglia”, featuring a doctor living in a three-generation family 
with his three children. This anecdotal evidence suggests that a more 
systematic study of media and culture might be productive. 
There is other survey evidence that the importance of family and 
having children has changed substantially with recent cohorts. In Austria, a 
long time-series of youth surveys has recently shown a significant 
discontinuity with respect to the importance of having children. While in 
1990 50 percent of young men and women aged 16-24 said that it was very 
important for a couple to have children, the percentage answering in this way 
had fallen to 27 percent in 2000 (Friesl 2001). 
                                                 
10 Average family size of children is greater than average family size of parents, 
because children from bigger families are “over-represented” (Preston 1976). It 
would be interesting to see if the trends in average family size (from the children’s 
point of view) are consistent with the period fertility rates given here, which give the 
parents’ point of view. 
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Figure 3  Timing of Period Fertility Decline Among Selected Low-Fertility 
European Countries. 
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The declines in family size ideals in Austria and Germany are 
evidence that the cultural momentum of the two-or-more child norm can 
indeed come to an end. Figure 3 shows the timing of period fertility declines 
among current low-fertility countries, with TFRs below 1.5. We see that 
period fertility has been low for the longest time in Germany. Sub-
replacement fertility in Austria began some five years later than in Germany. 
Fertility rates declined below replacement in Italy towards the end of the 
1970s, about a decade after Germany. In Spain and Greece, period fertility 
went below replacement in the 1980s.  
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IMPLICATIONS 
On average, achieved fertility has always been slightly less than 
ideal family size in industrial countries. The unexpected obstacles of life, the 
coordination of couples, career surprises, health difficulties, problems with 
conception, all combine in a way that populations on average rarely have as 
many children as their members say they prefer. Does this mean that the 
achieved fertility of young German-speaking cohorts will also be less than 
their stated ideals? If so, we should perhaps expect further declines in cohort 
fertility. On the other hand, it may be that the shortfall does not carry-over 
into cohorts with sub-replacement ideals, who may be more realistic about 
their actual family-size prospects.  
Another implication of a generational transmission mechanism is 
that other countries should soon follow the German-speaking countries in 
their preference for below-replacement families. Venturing a prediction, we 
expect ideal family size in Italy to drop below replacement in the next 
decade, and to drop in Spain and Greece in the subsequent decade. We may 
be wrong. Perhaps in the intervening years there will actually be an increase 
in achieved fertility. Or, it may be that the Austrian and German experience 
is not culturally transferable to other countries, particularly to Mediterranean 
countries with a long history of large-family norms (Reher 1998). 
It is worth considering that in an extreme form generational 
conditioning could cause a downward spiral of fertility. The family size 
ideals of each generation would be influenced by the fertility regime in 
which they grew up, but their own fertility would fall short of this ideal, 
pushing ideal family size of the next generation ever lower. However, it is 
premature to assert that such a dynamic will actually take place. The TFR 
has been declining in the European countries for several decades now and 
we have not yet seen a decline in ideal family size in any countries other 
than Germany and Austria. Furthermore, even if conditioning has some 
influence, the period factors, which have played such a strong role in the past 
(Ní Bhrolcháin 1987), can be expected to continue to play a strong role in 
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the future. Still, the theory does imply that, other things being equal, fertility 
may continue to decline. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
In the larger debate about below-replacement fertility, childbearing 
intentions have been largely ignored because they have seemed to be such an 
unresponsive indicator of changing behaviour. Now, for the first time, we 
see that fertility ideals really do seem to be changing. Demographers have 
placed great emphasis on the importance of tempo effects, delayed 
childbearing, in producing low period fertility rates. The survey results we 
present here, however, indicate a deeper and more durable societal change, a 
decline in family size ideals.  
What does this imply about future fertility? First of all, it would 
suggest to us that we should not be surprised if fertility declines further in 
Germany – or fails to increase, as Bongaarts and others have argued. 
Expected fertility averages 1.5 children per women among the younger 
cohorts in Austria and Germany. It would not surprise us if cohort fertility 
does not surpass these levels. Second, low family size-ideals may create a 
momentum of their own making it more difficult for pro-natalist policy 
makers to raise fertility levels in the future. Finally, if the generational lag in 
fertility preferences is correct, this would imply that we will see falling 
family size ideals in other low-fertility countries, like Italy and Spain, in the 
decade or so ahead. 
The below-replacement ideals prevalent among young Austrians and 
Germans may or may not be a sign of the future in low-fertility populations. 
But it is notable that for the first time people’s stated preferences have 
deviated from the two-child ideal that has held such sway since the end of 
the baby boom. It is hard to imagine that this reconceptualization of family 
life will be without any consequences, just as it is hard to imagine that low 
fertility can persist indefinitely without being accompanied by a change in 
ideals. 
 20
The emergence of below-replacement ideals among Austrians and 
Germans in the Eurobarometer survey should focus renewed attention on 
family size ideals. We will want to keep our eyes on the preferences that are 
revealed in the years to come. 
 
 21
References 
Ajzen, Icek, and Martin Fishbein. 1980. Understanding attitudes and 
predicting behaviour, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice and Hall. 
Bongaarts, John. 1998. Fertility and reproductive preferences in Post-
transitional societies, Population Council, Policy Research Division, 
Working Paper, No. 114. 
Bongaarts, John. 2001. Fertility and reproductive preferences in post-
transitional societies, Global fertility transition, Supplement to 
Population and Development Review, Vol.27, pp.260-281. 
Billari, Francesco C., and Chris Wilson. 2001. Convergence toward 
diversity? Cohort dynamics in the transition to adulthood in 
contemporary Western Europe, Max Planck Institute for 
Demographic Research, Working Paper, 39. 
Bulatao, Rodolfo A., and Ronald D. Lee 1983. Determinants of fertility in 
developing countries, Vol.1, London, Academic Press.  
Chesnais, Jean-Claude. 1996. Fertility, family and social policy, Population 
and Development Review, Vol.22, No. 4, pp.729-739. 
Chesnais, Jean-Claude. 2000. Determinants of below replacement fertility, 
in: Below replacement fertility, Population Bulletin of the United 
Nations, Special Issue 1999, No. 40/41, pp.126-136. 
Coleman, David. 1996. New patterns and trends in European Fertility: 
international and sub-national comparisons. David Coleman (ed.). 
Europe’s Population in the 1990s, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Council of Europe. 2001. Recent demographic development in Europe, 
Strasbourg, Council of Europe Publishing. 
European Commission. 1979. The Europeans and their children, 
Eurobarometer 11, organised and supervised by DG Press and 
Communication, Brussels. 
 22
European Commission. 1990. Family and the desire for children, 
Eurobarometer 32, organised and supervised by DG Press and 
Communication, Brussels. 
EUROSTAT. 2001. Europäische Sozialstatistik Bevölkerung, Luxembourg, 
European Communities. 
Freedman, Ronald, Deborah S. Freedman, and Arland Thornton. 1980. 
Changes in fertility expectations and preferences between 1962 and 
1977: their relation to final parity, Demography, Vol.17, No. 1, pp.1-
11. 
Frejka, Tomas, and John Ross. 2001. Paths to sub-replacement fertility: the 
empirical evidence, Global fertility transition, Supplement to 
Population and Development Review, Vol.27, pp.213-254. 
Friesl, Christian. 2001. Experiment Jung-Sein. Die Wertewelt 
Österreichischer Jugendlicher, Vienna, Czernin Verlag. 
Gauthier, Anne H. 2001. The impact of public policies on families and 
demographic behaviour, paper presented at the ESF/EURESCO 
Conference on The Second Demographic Transition in Europe, Bad 
Herrenhalb, Germany, June 23-28 (available at 
http://www.demogr.mpg.de/Papers/workshops). 
Hendershot, Gerry E., and Paul J. Placek 1981. Predicting fertility, 
Lexington, MA: Lexington Books. 
Inglehart, Ronald. 1990. Culture shift in advanced industrial society, 
Princeton, Princeton University Press. 
Kohler, Hans-Peter. 2001. Fertility and social interaction: an economic 
perspective, New York, Oxford University Press. 
Lee, Ronald. 1980. Aiming at moving target: period fertility and changing 
reproductive goals, Population Studies, 34, pp.205-226. 
 23
Lesthaeghe, Ron, and Johan Surkyn. 1988. Cultural dynamics and economic 
theories of fertility change, Population and Development Review, 
Vol. 14, No. 1, pp.1-45. 
Livi Bacci, Massimo. 2001. Comment: Desired Family size and the future 
course of fertility, Global fertility transition, Supplement to 
Population and Development Review, Vol.27, pp.282-289. 
Livi Bacci, Massimo, and Gustavo De Santis. 2001. Reflections on the 
economics of the fertility decline in Europe, Paper presented at the 
ESF/EURESCO Conference on The Second Demographic 
Transition in Europe, Bad Herrenhalb, Germany, June 23-28. 
Menniti, Adele. 2001. Fertility intentions and subsequent behaviour: first 
results of a panel study, paper presented to the EAPS, European 
Population Conference, Helsinki, June 7-9. 
Miller, Warren B., and David J. Pasta. 1995. How does childbearing affect 
fertility motivations and desires? Social Biology, Vol.42, No. 3-4, 
pp.185-198. 
Monnier, Alain. 1987. Projects de fécondité et fécondité effective. Une 
enquête longitudinale: 1974, 1976, 1979, Population, No. 6, pp.819-
842. 
Morgan, Philip S. 1982. Parity-specific fertility intentions and uncertainty: 
the United States, 1970 to 1976, Demography, Vol.19, No. 3, 
pp.215-334. 
Nambodiri, Krishnan. 1983. Sequential fertility decision making and the life 
course. Rodolfo A. Bulatao, and Ronald D. Lee (eds.). Determinants 
of fertility in developing countries, Vol.2, New York, Academic 
Press. 
National Research Council. 2001. Diffusion Processes and fertility 
transition: selected perspectives, Committee on Population. John B. 
 24
Casterline, (ed.). Division of Behavioural and Social Sciences and 
Education. Washington, DC, National Academy Press. 
Ní Bhrolcháin, Márie. 1987. Period parity progression ratios and birth 
intervals in England and Wales, 1941-1971: a synthetic life table 
analysis, Population Studies, Vol.41, No. 1, pp.103-125. 
OECD 2002. Labour force statistics, 1981-2001, Paris. 
Preston, Samuel H. 1976. Family size of children, family size of women, 
Demography, Vol.31, pp.105-114. 
Pritchett, Lant H. 1994. Desired fertility and the impact of population 
policies, Population and Development Review, Vol.20, No. 1, pp.1-
55. 
Reher, David Sven. 1998. Family ties in Western Europe: persistent 
contrasts, Population and Development Review, Vol.24, No. 2, 
pp.203-234. 
Rindfuss, Ronald R., Philip S. Morgan, and Gray Swicegood. 1988. First 
births in America: changes in the timing of parenthood, Berkeley 
and Los Angeles, University of California Press. 
Ryder, Norman B. 1981. Changes in parity orientation from 1970 to 1975. 
Hendershot, Gerry E., and Paul J. Placek. Predicting fertility, 
Lexington, MA: Lexington Books. 
Schoen, Robert, Young. J. Kim, Constance A. Nathanson, Jason Fields, and 
Nan Marie Astone. 1997. Why do Americans want children? 
Population and Development Review, Vol.23, No. 2, pp.333-358. 
Schoen, Robert, Nan Marie Astone, Young J. Kim, and Constance A. 
Nathanson. 1999. Do fertility intentions affect fertility behavior? 
Journal of Marriage and the Family, Vol.61, No. 3, pp.790- 799. 
Schoenmaeckers, Ronald C., and Edith Lodewijckx. 1999. Demographic 
behaviour in Europe: some results from FFS country reports and 
 25
suggestions fro further research, European Journal of Population, 
Vol.15, pp.207-240. 
Symeonidou, Haris. 2000. Expected and Actual Family Size in Greece: 
1983-1997, European Journal of Population, Vol. 16, No. 4, 
pp.335-352. 
Toulemon, Laurent. 2001. Why fertility is not so low in France, paper 
presented at the IUSSP – International Union for Scientific Study of 
Population - Seminar on International perspectives on Low fertility: 
trends, theories and policies, Tokyo, March 21-23. 
United Nations. 1999. Dictionary of demographic and reproductive health 
terminology, POPIN, Population Information Network (available at: 
http://www.popin.org). 
Van de Giessen, Hans. 1992. Using birth expectations information in 
national population forecasts. Nico Keilman, and Harri Cruijsen, 
(eds.). National population forecasting in industrialized countries, 
NIDI and CBGS publications. 
Van de Kaa, Dirk J. 2001. Postmodern fertility preferences: from changing 
value orientation to new behaviour, Global fertility transition, 
Supplement to Population and Development Review, Vol.27, 
pp.290-331. 
Van Hoorn, Wim, and Nico Keilman. 1997. Births expectations and their use 
in fertility forecasting, EUROSTAT Working Paper. 
Westoff, Charles F., and Norman B. Ryder. 1977. The predictive validity of 
reproductive intentions, Demography, Vol.14, pp.431-453. 
Westoff, Charles F. 1981. The validity of birth intentions: evidence from 
U.S. longitudinal studies. Gerry E. Hendershot, and Paul J. Placek. 
Predicting fertility, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, pp.51-74. 
 26
Yamaguchi, Kazuo, and Linda R. Ferguson. 1985. The stopping and spacing 
of childbirths and their birth-history predictors: rational-choice 
theory and event-history analysis, American Sociological Review, 
Vol.60, No. 2, pp.272-298. 
 27
